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RELIGION AND RACE: THE MINISTERIAL 
EXCEPTION REEXAMINED 
Ian Bartrum* 
The ministerial exception has, at long last, arrived before the Supreme 
Court.  In Hosanna-Tabor, the Justices will finally consider the 
controversial doctrine that shields religious organizations from 
antidiscrimination suits brought by ministerial employees.1  In part because 
the exception guards a highly contested border between two fundamental 
constitutional values—equal protection and religious liberty—it has been 
the subject of significant discord among circuit courts.  Although lower 
federal courts have recognized and applied some version of the ministerial 
exception for almost forty years, they have diverged widely on its proper 
scope and substance.2  That is, courts have agreed neither on which jobs 
count as ―ministerial,‖ nor on the kinds of claims from which religious 
employers are ―excepted.‖3  As this colloquy‘s other contributors make 
clear, Hosanna-Tabor seems better positioned to settle the former question 
than the latter.4  Nonetheless, I think the case‘s appearance on the Court‘s 
docket gives us occasion to revisit other controverted aspects of the 
ministerial exception, and that is my intention here. 
In this Essay, I acknowledge that the ministerial exception serves 
important constitutional values, but contend that those values must yield to 
a newer national commitment to end racial discrimination.  I argue in favor 
of robust doctrinal protections for church autonomy in most ministerial 
hiring decisions, but because race occupies a special and central place in 
our modern constitutional consciousness, I conclude that we cannot permit 
religious organizations to discriminate on that basis.  I begin, however, with 
 
*
  Associate Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.  
Thanks to Akhil Amar, Bruce Ackerman, Katie Graham, Kurt Lash, and Chris Lund for thoughtful 
insights and commentary.  Thanks also to the other participants in this discussion, and especially 
Colloquy editors, for their guidance. 
1
  597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (link). 
2
  The seminal case is McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) (link). 
3
  Compare Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 97-2648, 1998 WL 
904528, at *7 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1998) (concluding that parochial school teachers qualify as ministers), 
with DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir. 1993) (concluding that such teachers 
are not ministers) (link).  For an excellent documentation of further divergences, see Christopher C. 
Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV 101 (forthcoming 2011) (link). 
4
  The issue in Hosanna-Tabor revolves around whether a ―called‖ teacher at a Lutheran school 
qualifies as a ―minister.‖  As such, the case will likely focus primarily on the so-called ―primary duties‖ 
test.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–11, Hosanna-Tabor, No.10-553 (Oct. 22, 2010) (link). 
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a brief discussion of the ministerial exception and the constitutional 
principles that it embodies. 
I. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
The ministerial exception emerged from the federal judiciary‘s efforts 
to implement Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in the early 1970s.  
Congress, it seems, foresaw potential conflict between antidiscrimination 
laws and religious liberty, and thus wrote an exemption for religious 
employers into the statute.  While the original House bill would not have 
subjected such employers to Title VII at all, the final Senate version 
exempted only religious preferentialism related to an employer‘s religious 
mission.5  In 1972, Congress revised the law to permit an array of religious 
groups—including schools and universities—to consider religion when 
filling a wide variety of positions.6  Thus, the modern statutory exemption is 
broad in scope, but relatively shallow in substance.  Religious employers 
may discriminate when hiring for nearly all jobs, but they may do so only 
on religious grounds—not on the basis of race, gender, or national origin.7 
Courts quickly concluded, however, that the statutory language did not 
adequately address the full range of constitutional questions involved.  
Although a narrow exemption in favor of religious preferences might be 
appropriate for lower-level employees, a venerable line of Supreme Court 
decisions seemed to call for greater deference to church autonomy in 
constitutive decisions about governance and ministering.8  Just two years 
after the 1972 amendments, the Fifth Circuit laid out the basic contours of 
the modern ministerial exception in a gender discrimination case: 
 
We find that the application of the provisions of Title VII 
to the employment relationship existing between The 
Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a church and its 
minister would result in an encroachment by the State into 
an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter 
by the principles of the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment. . . .  We therefore hold that Congress did not 
intend, through the nonspecific wording of the applicable 
provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment 
relationship between church and minister.9 
 
5
  Janet S. Belcove-Shalin, Ministerial Exception and Title VII Claims: Case Law Grid Analysis, 2 
NEV. L.J. 86, 90–91 (2002). 
6
  Senator Sam Ervin famously claimed his namesake amendment was necessary to ―take the 
political hands of Caesar off of the institutions of God . . . .‖  Id. at 91 (quoting King‘s Garden, Inc. v. 
FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 55 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1964)). 
7
  Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2006) (link). 
8
  See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559–60 (5th Cir. 1972) (discussing cases). 
9
  Id. at 560–61. 
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The doctrinal exception, then, is something like the obverse of the 
statutory exemption.  Rather than broad and shallow, the ministerial 
exception is narrow and deep: it applies to a smaller class of hiring 
decisions, but it permits almost any kind of discrimination—including acts 
of racial discrimination we would find constitutionally abhorrent in almost 
any other context. 
There are, however, several excellent justifications for the exception in 
something like the form in which it now exists.  These arguments are 
perhaps best understood in terms of the particular constitutional language in 
which they are rooted.  For example, there are persuasive historical and 
ethical arguments—of the kind Rick Garnett and Thomas Berg make10—
that arise primarily out of the Free Exercise Clause.  There are also 
compelling structural and prudential claims—what Chris Lund calls the 
exception‘s ―relational‖ and ―autonomy‖ components11—based in the 
Establishment Clause.12  Of course, not all commentators accept these 
arguments.  Some very thoughtful people, including Caroline Mala Corbin 
in this discussion, have asked tough doctrinal questions about whether the 
Constitution requires courts to place religious organizations above the law, 
so to speak, when they hire and fire ministerial employees.13  I think a quick 
assessment of these competing positions can help clarify important 
questions the exception raises, and it will provide a nice backdrop for my 
own thoughts about the difficult constitutional relationship between race 
and religion. 
In their amicus brief to the Court, and again in this colloquy, 
Professors Garnett and Berg make the case that the ministerial exception is 
a straightforward entailment of our longstanding constitutional commitment 
to the institutional separation of church and state.14  Their argument looks to 
the intellectual and political history of disestablishment in Europe and the 
colonies, and they conclude that the Founders were distinctly aware of the 
dangers that arise when the state interferes in matters of church 
governance.15  Theirs is the history of an idea—liberty of conscience—that 
 
10
  Brief Amici Curiae of Professor Eugene Volokh et al. in Support of Petitioner at 6, Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 
2470847 [hereinafter ―Garnett & Berg‖] (link). 
11
  Lund, supra note 3, at 104–05. 
12
  For a complete taxonomy of the modalities of constitutional argument (historical, structural, 
ethical, etc.), see generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1982). 
13
  Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. 
EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 96 (2011) [hereinafter Corbin, Irony] (link); Caroline Mala 
Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination 
Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007) (link). 
14
  See Garnett & Berg, supra note 10, at 3. 
15
  See id. 
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traces its lineage from Thomas Aquinas, to Martin Luther and John Calvin, 
on to John Locke and the dissenting American Baptists.16  For the Founders, 
this idea was almost certainly the intellectual foundation of both the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, and institutional entanglement 
between civil and religious authorities posed one of the greatest practical 
threats to the abstract ideal.17  Garnett and Berg go on to argue that these 
founding principles gave rise to a uniquely American tradition of 
institutional separation—a constitutional ethos now reflected in a body of 
doctrine known as the ―church autonomy‖ cases.18  Ultimately, they make 
the historical and ethical claim, rooted primarily in the Free Exercise 
Clause, that we have a fundamental constitutional commitment to shield 
church governance questions from most kinds of state oversight, and it is 
this commitment that the ministerial exception embodies. 
Professor Lund argues that there are also important structural and 
prudential reasons to keep the exception alive and strong.  He identifies 
three basic justifications for the ministerial exception—what he calls its 
―relational,‖ ―conscience,‖ and ―autonomy‖ components.19  While Lund‘s 
―conscience‖ component relies on some of the historical evidence described 
above, his ―relational‖ and ―autonomy‖ components consider instead the 
relationships between constitutional institutions and the practical 
consequences of constitutional policy decisions.20  His ―relational‖ 
justification reflects the basic nature of organized religious institutions, 
which exist only inasmuch as their memberships share a core set of 
religious beliefs or principles.21  The moment that a civil authority starts to 
impose external membership criteria, these organizations cease to be 
―religious,‖ as the state, rather than a divine, has begun to define the terms 
of their existence.  Structurally, therefore, a constitutional commitment to 
disestablishment requires a complete separation between church and civil 
governance, and a strong ministerial exception protects this division.22  
Lund‘s ―autonomy‖ component applies these structural lessons to the 
particularly acute case of ministerial appointments.23  Choices about 
spiritual leadership are among the most important constitutive decisions a 
church can make, and Lund identifies four kinds of prudential concerns that 
 
16
  See generally Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 346 (2002).  The idea, succinctly put, is that a just government must not require its citizens to 
choose between their duties to God and their duties to the state—in effect, forcing a choice between 
prison and eternal damnation.  Id. at 350–52. 
17
  See Garnett & Berg, supra note 10, at 5–6. 
18
  See id. at 7–8. 
19
  Lund, supra note 3, at 104–05. 
20
  Id. 
21
  Id. at 121–22. 
22
  See id. at 125–27. 
23
  Id. at 131–34. 
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arise when the state second-guesses their choices.24  These difficulties arise 
from the array of remedies employment law may impose, which could 
involve reinstatement of a dismissed minister, institutional restructuring 
after a class action suit, or sustained state supervision with its concomitant 
regulatory entanglements.25  Lund rightly argues that, in practice, these 
remedies would pose a very serious threat to a church‘s spiritual mission.  
In the interest of constitutional policy, then, it makes good sense to shield 
religious organizations from the supervisory apparatus of employment 
antidiscrimination laws.  Combined, Lund‘s ―relational‖ and ―autonomy‖ 
components suggest that sound constitutional structure and prudence 
require a broad and deferential ministerial exception. 
On the other side of the debate, Professor Corbin makes the doctrinal 
claim that neither of the two religion clauses requires the kind of broad 
constitutional deference the ministerial exception extends to religious 
organizations.26  As a matter of Free Exercise Clause doctrine, she argues 
that, after the Court‘s decision in Employment Division v. Smith,27 neutral 
and generally applicable laws—such as Title VII or the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA)—need not provide exemptions when they 
incidentally burden religious practice.28  As a matter of Establishment 
Clause doctrine, if courts use the ―neutral principles of law‖ approach in 
deciding employment cases, the only institutional entanglements likely to 
arise will actually boil down to Free Exercise Clause exemption claims, 
which also fail after Smith.29  That is, while a court must defer to a church‘s 
interpretation of its own doctrine, the Constitution provides no relief when 
this doctrine runs afoul of a neutral and generally applicable law.  From this 
perspective, the ministerial exception becomes wholly unnecessary because 
the statutory exemptions provide religious organizations with all the 
constitutional protection they deserve. 
I am generally more sympathetic to Garnett, Berg, and Lund‘s 
arguments than to Corbin‘s.  The problem with Corbin‘s position is that, as 
a doctrinal claim, it is only as strong as the doctrine on which it relies, and 
Smith cannot bear the weight she asks of it.  First, the case is weak as a 
matter of precedent.  Simply put, Smith was wrong the day it was decided.  
It provoked intense public outcry at the time and remains very controversial 
today.30  Corbin‘s arguments notwithstanding, I think the Court will likely 
 
24
  Id. at 134. 
25
  Id. at 135–46. 
26
  Corbin, Irony, supra note 13, at 98. 
27
  494 U.S. 872 (1990) (link). 
28
  Corbin, Irony, supra note 13, at 104–05. 
29
  Id.  The ―neutral principles‖ approach, derived from the Court‘s opinion in Jones v. Wolf, asks 
judges to treat all relevant evidence in a case from a neutral legal perspective, but to defer to church 
authorities whenever controversies over religious doctrine arise.  443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (link). 
30
  For a discussion of the reaction to Smith, see Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious 
Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 118 (1993) (link). 
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read Smith‘s holding as narrowly as possible in future decisions, and the 
opinion itself provides several important caveats.31  Second, Congress has 
undermined the case‘s doctrinal value.  In response to Smith, Congress 
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which restored 
strict scrutiny as the standard of review for state or federal laws that place 
substantial burdens on religious practice.32  The Court struck down RFRA‘s 
application to state laws as beyond Congress‘s authority under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,33 but the statute remains constitutional as applied 
to federal laws.34  As the Court made clear in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita 
Beneficente: ―[T]he Federal Government may not, as a statutory matter, 
substantially burden a person‘s exercise of religion, even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability.‖35  Title VII and the ADA are, of 
course, federal laws, which means that even if Corbin is correct in asserting 
that the Constitution does not require courts to recognize a ministerial 
exception, it remains likely that RFRA does.36  Thus, with its cornerstone 
weakened, Corbin‘s larger doctrinal argument begins to crumble. 
I still harbor serious reservations, however, about the ministerial 
exception‘s application in the context of racial discrimination claims despite 
my general agreement with the exception‘s supporters.  There are 
compelling historical, ethical, and doctrinal reasons to think that racial 
discrimination presents a special constitutional case; that it in fact invokes 
constitutional values that supersede the religion clauses.  So, with this 
generally strong ministerial exception in mind, Part II explores the troubled 
constitutional confluence of religion and race. 
II. RACE, RELIGION, AND CONSTITUTIONAL HIERARCHY 
Unspoken racism remained a central part of the new Constitution when 
the First Congress convened in 1789 to draft the Bill of Rights.  Meeting 
under the auspices of a document that counted ―other Persons‖ at three-
fifths their actual number and precluded any limit on the ―Importation of 
 
31
  For an excellent discussion of these caveats, including Smith‘s explicit preservation of the church 
autonomy cases, see Lund, supra note 3, at 153–55. 
32
  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006) (link). 
33
  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (link). 
34
  See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) 
(link). 
35
  Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
36
  I realize that some courts, including in the Sixth Circuit whence Hosanna-Tabor arises, have held 
that the RFRA does not apply in suits between private parties.  Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day 
Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 411 (6th Cir. 2010) (link).  This dubious reasoning, however, hardly 
seems apposite in employment discrimination cases, in which the EEOC often sues on behalf of private 
plaintiffs.  Indeed, McGill itself explicitly contemplates RFRA‘s applicability in such cases.  Id. 
(distinguishing copyright cases from employment cases on this basis).  It is true, of course, that RFRA 
does not affect Smith‘s application to state nondiscrimination laws, and Corbin‘s argument has 
correspondingly greater bite in that context. 
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such Persons‖ until 1808, Congress began working on a list of rights and 
privileges reserved to ―Free‖ Americans.37  In this historical context, one 
would hardly expect legislators to attempt to balance the newly enumerated 
liberties against considerations of basic racial equality.  Of course, no such 
balance was struck in drafting the First Amendment, which, as Hugo Black 
was fond of reminding us, presents itself in starkly absolute terms.38  As a 
result, it is very difficult to argue, as a historical or textual matter, that the 
Framers or Ratifiers intended to limit the free exercise of religion to racially 
nondiscriminatory practices.  It is equally clear, however, that our 
Constitution has changed a great deal since 1789.  Indeed, the original sin 
of black slavery very nearly ended the entire American endeavor before it 
was one hundred years old, and there is no denying that new constitutional 
values—values forged in the crucibles of war and civil disobedience—now 
inform and temper our founding principles.39  In this Part, I hope to bring 
history, ethos, and doctrine together to demonstrate that the most important 
of these new principles is a virtual ban on racial discrimination—a ban that 
now trumps even religious liberty. 
A. History 
Congressional efforts to undermine the Constitution‘s racist features 
began almost as soon as the Legislature convened.  Indeed, on the very day 
the First Congress began debate on the Religion Clauses, it reaffirmed the 
Northwest Ordinance, first enacted by the Confederation Congress two 
years earlier.40  The Ordinance, which defined the relationship between 
territorial settlers and the federal government, has now achieved canonical 
stature in constitutional argument, and served as something of a constitution 
in itself for those who settled the northwestern lands.41  Central among the 
conditions and covenants it established was a promise that the Northwest 
Territory would remain free soil: ―There shall be neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment 
of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.‖42  This 
aspiration spoke to antislavery advocates, in the words of Akhil Amar, as ―a 
much purer symbol of what America could and should be—a symbol of the 
West, a symbol of the future, a symbol of hope, a symbol of free soil, free 
 
37
  U.S. CONST. art. I. § 2, cl. 3; § 9, cl. 1 (link).  The vast majority of ―other‖ Americans were, of 
course, of African descent. 
38
  See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) (―I read ‗no 
law . . . abridging‘ to mean no law abridging.‖) (link). 
39
  For an enlightening account of the ―reconstruction‖ the Bill of Rights underwent following the 
Civil War, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998). 
40
  Act of Aug. 7, 1789, 1 Stat. 50 (link). 
41
  For an excellent discussion of the Ordinance‘s symbolic importance in our constitutional 
imaginations, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA‘S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 448–51 (forthcoming 
2012) (on file with author). 
42
  1 Stat. 53 (quoting the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 art. VI) (link). 
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men, and freedom.‖43  While efforts to end slavery are not in themselves 
efforts to end racial distinctions or discrimination, the Northwest Ordinance 
is certainly historical evidence that, from the earliest days, many Americans 
believed that political compromises had left something fundamental—a 
basic equality principle of the highest order—out of the new Constitution. 
The national debate over slavery became only more intense, of course, 
and there is not enough space here to rehearse all of the political wrangling 
of the next half-century.  It is worth briefly considering, however, the 
Supreme Court‘s bungled attempt to put an end, once and for all, to that 
debate.  Although Chief Justice Roger Taney‘s convoluted constitutional 
syntax itself makes Dred Scott v. Sandford worth reading, the decision is 
important here because Taney drew explicit links between race, citizenship, 
and constitutional rights.  One can conceivably read the Northwest 
Ordinance in racially neutral terms—as an attack on slavery of any kind—
but it is impossible to miss the constitutional significance that Taney placed 
on race in Dred Scott.  By concluding that the Constitution treated blacks as 
―so far inferior that they had no rights a white man was bound to respect,‖ 
he definitively tied the privileges of citizenship to racial identity.44  No 
longer was the distinction one between ―free‖ and ―unfree‖ persons; in 
Dred Scott, once-unspoken racism emerged as a bright constitutional line.  
If the aspirational equality at the heart of the Northwest Ordinance elevated 
it into the constitutional canon, then Taney‘s unabashed bigotry has 
certainly condemned Dred Scott to the very depths of the anticanon. 
These two historical texts—one canonical, the other anticanonical—
reveal both the centrality of the race question in antebellum 
constitutionalism and the decisive answer we have now settled upon.  
Indeed, the first postwar amendments spoke directly to these texts.  The 
Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished ―slavery or involuntary servitude,‖ 
self-consciously echoes the language of the Northwest Ordinance‘s central 
covenant, thus elevating the territorial aspiration to a fundamental national 
commitment.45  Moreover, the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment plainly reveals an intention to repudiate Dred Scott.46  
Accordingly, the Amendment‘s final language flatly rejects Taney‘s effort 
to link citizenship with race, and it goes on to guarantee all ―persons‖—
even noncitizens—the ―equal protection of the laws.‖47  Reaching 
backwards in time, this new language, won at tremendous cost, reflects 
national recognition that a fundamental constitutional value had not made it 
into the original Bill of Rights.  In crafting the Reconstruction amendments, 
 
43
  AMAR, supra note 41, at 450. 
44
  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856) (link). 
45
  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; supra note 42 and accompanying text; accord AMAR, supra note 41, at 
450. 
46
  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (remarks of Senator Jacob Howard). 
47
  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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the Republicans intended to codify this recognition by placing basic racial 
and ethnic equality at the very heart of the reformed Constitution. 
Indeed, the determination to root out racial discrimination went well 
beyond the simple promise of equal protection of the laws, and included 
efforts to weaken or destroy social institutions that perpetuated white 
supremacy in the South.  The Fourteenth Amendment‘s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause took aim at a host of slavery codes that tightly 
controlled the exercise of religion among blacks.48  Aware that much 
religious teaching denounced slavery as immoral, and fearful that religious 
meetings could become engines of slave revolt, many southern states had 
enacted laws to closely monitor religious exercise.49  And, beyond 
suppressing religiously inspired resistance, the slave codes actively 
employed religion to help enforce, if not justify, the worst kinds of racial 
discrimination.50  Kurt Lash has pointed out that, ―[e]ven when a religious 
gathering received the state‘s imprimatur, the content of the sermon was 
dictated by proslavery Christian ideology with the message invariably 
focused on the biblical admonition that slaves ‗obey their masters.‘‖51  
Writing before the Civil War, abolitionist William Goodell observed that 
slaveholders often utilized religion as a tool of spiritual subjugation: ―The 
claim of chattlehood extends to the soul as well as to the body, for the body 
cannot be otherwise held and controlled.  There is no other religious 
despotism on the face of the earth so absolute, so irresponsible, so soul-
crushing as this.‖52 
With these practices in mind, members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress 
repeatedly pointed to the abuse—indeed, the ―debauch[ment]‖—of religion 
to racist ends as among the South‘s great offenses against slaves‘ 
independent and equal humanity.53  Thus, many of the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s drafters intended to include not just free exercise, but also 
 
48
  See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1131–37 (1994) [hereinafter Lash, Exercise]; Kurt 
T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle , 
27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1085, 1142–45 (1995) [hereinafter Lash, Establishment]. 
49
  See, e.g., Lash, Establishment, supra note 48, at 1137 n. 234 (citing an Alabama law that 
mandated the presence of ―five respectable slave-holders‖ at any black religious meeting). 
50
  See Lash, Exercise, supra note 48, at 1135. 
51
  Id. 
52
  WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ITS DISTINCTIVE 
FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND ILLUSTRATIVE FACTS 254 (Negro 
Univs. Press 1968) (1853) (quoted in Lash, Establishment, supra note 48, at 1137). 
53
  See Lash, Establishment, supra note 48, at 1142–43 (collecting Congressional commentary).  The 
quoted language is taken from Ohio Representative James Ashley‘s speech to the House in support of 
the Thirteenth Amendment: ―[Slave power] has silenced every free pulpit within its control, and 
debauched thousands which ought to have been independent.‖  CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 138 
(1865) (emphasis added). 
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freedom from oppressive and discriminatory religious establishments, 
among the privileges and immunities guaranteed to all American citizens.54 
Additionally, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment created an entirely 
new congressional power to remediate racial discrimination—a federal 
intrusion into private conduct well beyond any imagined in 1789.55  
Congress quickly put this authority to work when it passed the Enforcement 
Acts aimed at the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacy groups, which 
had largely ignored both the Amendment and the earlier Civil Rights Act of 
1866.56  The Republicans well understood that a network of private 
organizations—many, like the Klan, with direct pretensions to religion—
still governed southern culture and life.  To this end, the Enforcement Acts 
directly targeted ―unlawful combinations‖ and ―conspiracies‖ of citizens 
that might obstruct black access to legal equality.57  Even as these Acts 
proved ineffectual, the Republicans pushed through further legislation 
aimed at private acts of racial discrimination.  The Civil Rights Act of 1875 
promised blacks ―full and equal enjoyment‖ of public accommodations, and 
it established a five hundred dollar fine for those who failed to so provide. 58  
These efforts leave little doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment‘s drafters 
believed that hard-won principles of racial equality should reach deep into 
American culture and life; indeed, it should temper and qualify freedoms 
and associations once thought to be well beyond federal supervision. 
The Republicans, of course, miscalculated the constitutional ethos of 
their time.  In fairly short order, Reconstruction fell by the wayside59 and 
the Supreme Court eviscerated the Fourteenth Amendment and struck down 
the Civil Rights Act,60 withering the promise of racial equality on the vine.  
And over the next half century, organized religion played a central role in 
the emergence of an overtly racist society.61  However, just because the 
Fourteenth Amendment was an idea ahead of its time does not change the 
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  See Lash, Establishment, supra note 48, at 1142–45.  This same sentiment might undercut a 
ministerial exception that protects acts of racial discrimination, inasmuch as such an exemption 
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  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
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  Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140; 1871 Enforcement Act, 17 Stat. 13.  Indeed, the 1871 Act was 
known colloquially as the ―Ku Klux Klan Act‖ because it directly targeted organized racial intimidation 
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  17 Stat. at 14. 
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  18 Stat. 335, 336 (1875). 
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  For an excellent account of the election of 1876, in which Democrats conceded the Presidency to 
Rutherford B. Hayes in return for the end of Reconstruction, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: 
AMERICA‘S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 564–82 (1988). 
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  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (link); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (link). 
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(2005). 
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original meaning and intention of the Equal Protection Clause.  As a 
historical matter, Republican authors of the Clause meant to reach into 
American life and impose new constitutional conditions—racial 
conditions—on previously private behaviors and decisions.  Among its 
targets were Southern perversions of religion and religious practice and 
religiously affiliated groups that helped facilitate racial oppression before 
and after the war.62  Although that intention clearly did not align with the 
existing ethos, our constitutional values would go through another dramatic 
recalibration in the years following World War II—shifts which the next 
Part briefly explores. 
B. Ethos 
In the late 1940s, black soldiers returning from the war against Nazism 
found themselves thrust back into the racial subordination of Jim Crow and 
northern sequestration.  Their discontent found an outlet in the NAACP, 
whose legal arm began executing a coordinated constitutional attack on the 
institutions of racial discrimination.63  These efforts came to dramatic 
fruition in the Supreme Court with Brown v. Board of Education and its 
progeny, which declared racial segregation illegal in most spheres of 
American life.64  In 1955, the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. emerged as 
the leader of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, and within a decade, a massive 
civil disobedience movement engulfed the nation.65  This movement posed 
profound questions for American democracy and eventually precipitated a 
fundamental evolution in our constitutional ethos.  By the time President 
Richard Nixon reaffirmed and extended the basic tenets of the Voting 
Rights Act in 1970,66 the nation had come to terms with the promise the 
Radical Republicans had originally made, but not delivered, in 1868.  It 
took a war, an occupation, and eventually a massive social uprising, but 
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racial equality finally assumed a place at the very center of our 
constitutional structure.67 
Bruce Ackerman famously argues that three ―constitutional moments‖ 
dramatically reshaped our constitutional landscape over the last century and 
a half.68  While Reconstruction is plainly one such moment, Ackerman 
argues that two other events that were not memorialized in new 
constitutional text also qualify: the New Deal revolution and the civil rights 
movement.69  These periods of dramatic political upheaval and mobilization 
allowed us to adopt more highly evolved constitutional principles.  They 
are, in effect, significant constitutional amendments accomplished outside 
of the Article V process.  For Ackerman, this means that Americans have 
actually lived in four distinct constitutional republics or ―regimes‖: the 
Founding regime, the Reconstruction regime, the New Deal regime, and the 
Civil Rights regime.70  To complicate matters more, each of these regimes 
incorporates, or synthesizes, certain salient features of its predecessors.71  
For example, the New Deal revolution fundamentally changed our ideas 
about the role government can and should play in ameliorating class 
disparities, but left racial injustices largely untouched.  The civil rights 
movement then extended these New Deal principles into the racial sphere.72 
Ackerman‘s ideas are highly sophisticated and rely, to some degree, on 
each of the modalities of constitutional argument.  Fundamentally, 
however, his claim is about the evolution of our constitutional ethos.  It is 
an effort to explain how our democracy comes to reflect new conceptions of 
justice without losing sight of the hard-won victories of previous 
generations—all given an anachronistic amendment mechanism that no 
longer provides a meaningful avenue for constitutional change.  A crucial 
part of this evolutionary process, however, is some codification of the 
principles that motivate a constitutionally empowered social movement.73  
In the case of the Civil Rights Movement, Ackerman claims this 
codification took the form of certain ―landmark statutes‖: the Civil Rights 
Act, the Voting Rights Act, and the Fair Housing Act.74  He believes that we 
should now regard these statutes as part of the constitutional canon, at the 
very least, and perhaps as part of the Constitution itself.  Ackerman 
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equality in the social sphere that we now associate with the Civil Rights Movement. 
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BRUCE ACKERMAN, 3 WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (forthcoming) (on file with 
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  REVOLUTION, supra note 68. 
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summarizes the change in ethos this way: ―The landmark statutes represent 
a sustained commitment by the American people to root out the 
institutionalized humiliation of minorities in crucial spheres of social life, 
and to transform these sociological realities providing an effective guarantee 
of equality in each of these spheres.‖75  In other words, the statutes make 
good on the Reconstruction-era promise to aggressively promote racial 
equality, even at the expense of once jealously guarded private liberties. 
Historically, then, the Radical Republicans intended to place 
significant racial qualifications on many previously sacrosanct rights, but 
the constitutional culture initially rejected their efforts.  After the New Deal, 
which dramatically enlarged federal administrative machinery and 
fundamentally changed our conception of government‘s role in society, the 
ethical groundwork was finally laid to accept the Reconstruction challenge.  
Still, it took massive civil disobedience and intense political struggle for the 
Civil Rights Movement to codify racial equality as a fundamental 
constitutional value.  By virtue of its historical and ethical pedigrees alone, 
racial equality is surely the hardest-won (and most often threatened) 
American constitutional principle.  It is for these reasons that we defend it 
most vigilantly.  When the commitment to promote racial equality comes 
into conflict with other constitutional principles, it is often the other 
principles that must give way.  The following Part explores some doctrinal 
reasons to think that this should be the case when the racial equality 
principle runs up against religious freedom. 
C. Doctrine 
The contributors to this colloquy differ as to which constitutional 
doctrine should guide our thinking about the ministerial exception.  Some 
believe the ―church autonomy‖ cases are the right place to start, while 
others claim that Employment Division v. Smith provides the best answers.  
I certainly agree that all of these cases are relevant—the autonomy cases 
more so than Smith—but the most relevant doctrine for my purposes 
emerges from what others may think an improbable source: the Supreme 
Court‘s 1983 decision in Bob Jones University v. United States.76  In that 
case, the Court confronted a direct clash between religious freedom and 
racial equality, and in so doing, offered some valuable insights into the 
potential hierarchy of the two principles.  In deciding against the religious 
institution, the Court covered some of the same historical and ethical 
ground I discussed above.  The Court‘s decision is thus a doctrinal 
recognition of our evolving ethical commitment to racial equality, a 
commitment that now places substantive constraints on existing doctrines 
with which it may conflict.  In this way, Bob Jones manifests precisely the 
kind of intergenerational synthesis—the blending of constitutional 
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regimes—that Ackerman describes.  For these reasons, I think it is very 
useful to explore Bob Jones‘s lessons with an eye towards the appropriate 
substance of the ministerial exception. 
The case arose out of a dispute over Bob Jones University‘s tax status.  
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts any organization 
operated for ―religious, charitable . . . or educational purposes‖—conditions 
the University seems to satisfy twice over.77  Beginning in 1970, however, 
the Internal Revenue Service (the IRS) decided that it could ―no longer 
legally justify allowing tax exempt status . . . to private schools which 
practice racial discrimination.‖78  The IRS concluded that the phrase 
―religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes‖ was actually shorthand 
for the ―basic common law concept [of ‗charity‘],‖ which does not embrace 
groups that act ―contrary to public policy.‖79  Because of the ―national 
policy to discourage racial discrimination in education,‖ the IRS decided 
that racially discriminatory organizations were no longer eligible for tax-
exempt status.80  The University, an eleemosynary institution, interpreted 
the Bible as forbidding interracial dating or marriage and therefore expelled 
students who engaged in or encouraged these practices.81  When the 
University received notice that the IRS would revoke its tax-exempt status, 
which it had enjoyed since 1954, it filed suit in federal district court.82 
The district court ruled against the IRS, based in part on the 
University‘s claim that the revocation burdened their exercise of religion 
and established a governmental preference for churches that promote 
certain public policies.83  The Fourth Circuit reversed, and in so doing, 
rejected the University‘s Free Exercise and Establishment Clause claims.84  
The circuit court applied strict scrutiny to the Free Exercise Clause claim 
and concluded that the government had a compelling interest to eradicate 
both public and private racial discrimination.85  Even more interesting, the 
circuit court purported to apply the Lemon test to the Establishment claim, 
but actually ended up concluding that ―certain governmental interests are so 
compelling that conflicting religious practices must yield in their favor‖—
even if this results in government preferentialism.86  For the Fourth Circuit, 
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racial discrimination, like polygamy before it, was an evil so profound that 
it could find no refuge in the religion clauses.87 
The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court, reasoning that ―[o]n 
occasion this Court has found certain governmental interests so compelling 
as to allow even regulations prohibiting religiously based conduct.‖88  In 
language worth quoting, the Court offered its reasons for concluding that 
ending racial discrimination in education was such an interest: ―[T]he 
government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial 
discrimination in education—discrimination that prevailed, with official 
approval, for the first 165 years of this Nation‘s constitutional history.  That 
governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of 
tax benefits places on petitioners‘ exercise of their religious beliefs.‖89  In 
this conflict between religious freedom and racial discrimination, then, the 
Court made it quite clear which constitutional value must triumph.  Race, 
given its historical and ethical lineage, is special.  Other forms of 
discrimination—gender, disability, and even sexual orientation—are 
working their way up the hierarchy, but for now, race remains special. 
There is no denying, of course, that the ministerial exception is not 
concerned with racial discrimination in education.  Moreover, church 
autonomy in religious and constitutive decisions is certainly a more 
significant constitutional concern than the comparatively minor burdens the 
tax code may impose.  For these reasons, the Court may well conclude that 
the lessons of Bob Jones are inapposite in this context.  Nonetheless, it is 
also true that nothing in the historical or ethical arguments I have made is 
specific to racial discrimination in education.  Indeed, those arguments may 
actually be more powerful in the employment context.  The extended 
discussion in Bob Jones regarding our national commitment to end racial 
discrimination—‖[f]ew social or political issues in our history have been 
more vigorously debated and more extensively ventilated‖—suggests that it 
may trump even the constitutional protection of church autonomy.90  In any 
case, it gives us good reason to think that, at least in the case of racial 
discrimination, the reach of the ministerial exception may be limited. 
In truth, permitting the state to supervise even this limited class of 
ministerial hiring decisions opens the door to some of the compelling 
objections that others in this colloquy have raised.  In particular, any kind of 
state oversight of ministerial hiring seems to compromise the important 
interests Chris Lund identifies as within the ministerial exception‘s 
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―structural‖ and ―autonomy‖ components.91  If courts are to enforce Title 
VII‘s nondiscrimination provisions against religious institutions they must 
necessarily impose some secular criteria, even on constitutive kinds of 
hiring decisions.  Likewise, court-supervised remedies will almost certainly 
result in the kinds of administrative entanglements the Lemon test seems to 
preclude.  Nonetheless, I suggest that these encroachments on religious 
freedom are necessary if we hope to uphold our newer and overriding 
national commitment to end racial discrimination.  In our modern hierarchy 
of constitutional rights, racial equality simply ranks above religious 
liberty—and the doctrinal protections afforded religious organizations 
under the ministerial exception should reflect this reality. 
CONCLUSION 
This colloquy‘s contributors approach the ministerial exception from a 
number of angles, but my approach may be the most idiosyncratic.  While I 
tend to agree with those who support a broad and deferential exception on 
historical and structural grounds, I do not believe that we should allow 
religious organizations to make employment decisions based on race.  Race 
has a long and controverted constitutional history, and racial equality thus 
occupies a special place among our democratic traditions.  Black slavery 
brought us to a catastrophic civil war less than a century after the founding 
of our nation, and the post-war constitutional amendments sought to 
permanently end both slavery and racial discrimination.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment, however, was an idea ahead of its time.  The federal 
government simply lacked the administrative apparatus to force race 
equality on an unwilling constitutional culture.  But by the 1950s, the 
administrative state was well entrenched, and the groundwork was laid for a 
revolution in our racial ethos.  That revolution came in the form of the civil 
rights movement.  After a century and a half of political struggle, civil war, 
and civil disobedience, racial equality finally assumed its place among the 
most fundamental of our constitutional values.  The Court‘s decision in Bob 
Jones University is doctrinal evidence that when racial equality comes into 
direct conflict with religious freedom, it is the latter that must give way.  
Other forms of employment discrimination are certainly undesirable, but at 
this moment in our constitutional evolution, they cannot trump religious 
freedom.  Racial equality, however, has been the animating principle of a 
fully consolidated constitutional revolution.  It now imposes special 
constitutional conditions on virtually every sphere of American life—
conditions from which even religious organizations are not exempt. 
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